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Abstract 
Legislation and practice are two arms of public policy planning.  Legislation 
empowers or enables; practice is the articulation and implementation of legislative 
principle. In New Zealand there has been widespread debate in recent years about the 
relative importance of practice versus legislation in achieving planning outcomes 
under its key planning legislation, the Resource Management Act 1991.  
 
This paper proposes that the effectiveness and efficiency of planning practice may 
depend on a range of factors, some of which are beyond the control of planners, and 
outside of legislation.  They include political priorities and the countervailing 
administrative responsibilities of the public agencies involved. 
 
Local government, as the agency in New Zealand which administers the Resource 
Management Act at local levels, is subject to a number of structural factors which 
may influence planning responsibilities and political and administrative commitment 
to those responsibilities.  A survey of district council planning officers was conducted 
which showed great variation in the levels of work and the nature of the tasks that 
were assigned to planning departments within different councils. The paper concludes 
that the range of factors which may limit the ability of planners to implement the 
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policies intended by legislation (in this case, the principles of the Resource 
Management Act), include both matters of practice, and contextual factors which are 
largely outside and beyond the control of planners. 
 
Introduction 
This article explores the gap that may arise between planning aims and intentions, as 
enshrined in legislation, and the contextual realities of planning at local levels of 
government.  These contextual realities impact on the actions of planners on a day-to-
day basis by influencing the nature and flow of work with which they have to deal, 
and the level of staff and other resources that are available for dealing with the work.   
 
The context of this exploration was the administration of district level plans under 
New Zealand's Resource Management Act 1991 (hereafter referred to as the RMA).  
In this article, I do not intend to look at the issue of plan preparation, but at plan 
implementation.  Plan implementation, which in New Zealand occurs largely, (but not 
exclusively) through direction of private sector development at local and regional 
levels, is an important factor determining the extent to which planning achieves its 
public policy objectives.   Although plan preparation and the quality of plans is 
equally important for assessing the extent to which planning practice achieves 
planning objectives (as enshrined in legislative principle), this area of study has been 
the subject of research in New Zealand by a number of investigators (Dixon et al, 
1997; Berke, 1994; Frieder, 1998; May et al, 1996).   Some of these researchers 
specifically mention the problem of variable administrative practice (for example, 
Dixon et al, 19997; May, 1997). 
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The focus on district level planning practice, as opposed to regional planning, was 
because it is this level of planning which has aroused most public controversy to date.  
The research reported within this paper includes results of a survey of local council 
(i.e. city and district council) planning departments conducted over the summer of 
1997/98.  The research involved a short questionnaire survey of the development 
control/resource consent managers of all 74 district councils
1
 in New Zealand.  64 
replies were received giving an 86% rate of return. 
 
Together with information from other sources, it is possible to construct a deeper 
understanding of how and why planning practice may fail to meet the expectations of 
politicians and the public, and why it may fail to achieve legislative objectives. 
 
The Resource Management Act and its Critics 
The RMA is in many respects an unusual piece of planning legislation.  In principle, it 
has allowed an integrated and comprehensive consideration of the environmental 
effects of development proposals by bringing together under one legislative umbrella 
previous the law relating to town and country planning, water and soil protection, and 
air quality.   It has "sustainable management of natural and physical resources"  
(Section 5, RMA, 1991) as a clearly articulated purpose.  'Sustainable management' is 
defined as "managing the use, development , and protection of natural and physical 
resources . . . while - 
                                                 
1
 District councils include cities, districts, and "unitary authorities", and all these forms are "local" in 
the sense that they are responsible for community services, including sewage, water, parks and reserves, 
streets, etc. "Regional" councils, have a different array of functions under New Zealand's Local 
Government Act. 
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(a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to 
meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and 
(c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the 
environment." 
 
The Act requires a focus on the effects of development rather than the nature or scale 
of development (zones  in plans are related to the types of effects generated by 
activities, rather than types of uses).  Social and economic matters are removed from 
consideration.  This exclusion of social and economic matters has been recently 
emphasised and reinforced by recently proposed amendments to the Act (Upton 
1998).   
 
The Act's focus on the biophysical effects of development to the exclusion of social 
and economic matters was in keeping with the market-oriented philosophies which 
prevailed in New Zealand central government circles at the time it was drafted 
(Memon, 1993 :93-94; Buhrs and Bartlett 1993: 113 - 134).  The Act thus mandates 
minimal exercise of control over the nature or scale of resource uses, provided that 
detrimental effects on the biophysical environment are avoided, remedied, or 
mitigated.  
 
Despite its legislative rationalism and the strong influence of economic libertarians in 
the creation of its final form, public criticism of the Act has grown in recent years and 
it has recently come under political and legislative review.   Much of this debate has 
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centred around the question of practice versus statutory policies and principle.  While 
critics have argued that it is the Act itself which is defective, others argue that the Act 
is fundamentally enabling in its structure, and that any problems associated with it are 
due to poor plan preparation or poor administrative practice on the part of the 
administering agencies.  (Church,  1996; Upton 1997:33). Much of the criticism of the 
Act is levelled by development interests and representatives of industry. (N Z Herald, 
1998; Business Herald, 1998).   A typical example is the comment by Planning 
Manager of BOMA NZ (Building Owners and Managers Association of New 
Zealand) who argues that  "complying with legislation such as the RMA and the 
Building Act is costing the commercial property and development industry both in 
dollars and in development opportunity. "(Crow 1997: 26)  A scathing criticism of the 
Act and its implementation was published by development representative and key 
critic Owen McShane.   Among the examples of poor planning practice cited by Mc 
Shane were “excessive” regulation of use of land; timidity and caution on the part of 
councils in relation to their assessment of development proposals, particularly in the 
face of new initiatives; inconsistencies in the interpretation and administration of the 
Act; the administrative monopoly which councils enjoy in implementation of the Act; 
lengthy time delays in development consent processing by local councils; over-
zealous judgements of detrimental environmental effects; and the imposition of unfair 
costs on private developers, ostensibly for public good.  (McShane, 1998).   
 
The environmental requirements of the Act have imposed significant extra costs on 
developers which did not arise under previous legislation, or not to the same degree.  
These costs include the cost of designing developments to higher environmental 
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performance standards, the cost of undertaking and providing evidence for an 
assessment of environmental effects, and 'user pays' costs which councils may recover 
for assessing and processing development applications. These costs may be 
significantly increased if there are delays in the processing of a development 
application due to public consultation procedures.  Thus it is hardly surprising to find 
that business and industry have voiced criticism of the provisions of the Act, 
especially where they feel that local government administration is to blame. 
 
Professional and academic criticism of the Act has been equally strong.   Frieder has 
criticised implementation of the Act in the following terms:  “Implementation does 
not appear to be progressing as it was envisioned, in an integrated fashion and by 
employing a range of policy mechanisms.  Instead, economic decisions are made 
without consideration of environmental impacts and the quality of the environment is 
treated as a second tier policy objective after customer service delivery and economic 
efficiency.  Maori values and concerns are not successfully incorporated into 
implementation programs and state-of-environment monitoring, a cornerstone of an 
effects-based framework, is still not a management priority.” (1998:19).   She sums up 
the barriers to implementation of the Act as: lack of advocacy for a strong 
environmental vision; inadequate data and monitoring; inexperience with the 
essentials of fair process; reliance on a system of accountabilities that favours outputs 
over outcomes; lack of resources to implement the Act as it was envisioned; and an 
unusual cultural relationship with "change" that permits macro changes while resisting 
micro changes.  In other words, New Zealanders seem to accept radical changes in 
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laws, institutions or organisational structures, but refuse to look at changing their own 
attitudes, behaviour or norms (Frieder 1998:20) . 
 
Barton has argued that “There is too much emphasis on procedures, not enough on 
outcomes.”  (1998:456), and that effects-based planning, "has led to an explosion of 
legal wrangling as the uncertainties in the complex web of the environment are 
exploited by development interests and by lawyers seeking to prove that one particular 
development will not breach critical thresholds" (Barton 1998:457).  
 
Dixon et al note that "The practice of administration of resource consents 
(development applications)  has been quite variable, even in the metropolitan councils 
with decades of statutory experience." (Dixon et al. 1997).  They have noted problems 
resulting from repeated organisational restructuring of local government and problems 
of integration and co-operation between different planning agencies.  
 
Gleeson and Grundy (Gleeson and Grundy 1997:293-313) have noted problems 
related to inconsistencies of approach to similar issues by different planning agencies, 
lack of integration between planning agencies in the way they deal with planning 
issues, problems of transparency, accountability and social equity in the processing of 
development applications,  increased transaction costs for small developers in relation 
to the process of applying for development consents, and costs/disincentives for the 
public in relation to submissions opposing development proposals. 
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Planners have thus been subjected to criticism from all directions in relation to RMA 
implementation: they favour the developers, they obstruct the developers; they are 
unduly cautious in relation to legislative intent, they are not cautious enough; they are 
administratively cautious; they are administratively cavalier; they are environmentally 
conservative, they are not conservative enough. 
 
Planning practice within New Zealand local government 
All proposals for the use, development or protection of land, air and water come 
within the ambit of the RMA (Environment 1998).  Depending on the nature and scale 
of the proposal,  a development application (known as a 'resource consent')  may or 
may not involve a political process of public hearing and decision-making by council.  
If the proposal is minor in scale or allowed by the plan, it may be processed entirely 
by planning staff.  If it does not comply with a plan or involves issues that are 
contentious, it may be subjected to public notification and the requirement for a public 
hearing. (Environment 1994).  Statutory time frames apply to each stage of the 
development process. Significantly different time frames apply depending on whether 
or not a development proposal requires public notification.   If the proposal is deemed 
(by planners) to have no significant detrimental environmental effects, the statutory 
time frame is 20 working days.  If it requires public notification and the opportunity 
for members of the public to make submissions, the process takes a minimum of 70 
working days.  This difference means that development applicants are often anxious to 
by-pass the public notification process, particularly as they also become subject to the 
uncertainty of public objection and opposition. 
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Planners may be subject to pressure: if they err on the side of public notification, they 
receive criticism from developers; if they err on the side of developers, they may be 
criticised by the public or make decisions which are contrary to the stated principles of 
the Act. 
 
Within most district and regional councils, implementation of the Resource 
Management Act takes place in a department or unit of the council that has specific 
responsibility for overseeing the processing of development applications.  Sometimes 
the responsibilities of this unit are limited to development administration; sometimes 
they include a range of other responsibilities.  The capacity of a planning department 
to deal effectively with its administrative responsibilities depends on a variety of 
factors, including the match between the nature and scale of the workload and the 
number and qualifications of staff.  Staff skills and judgement are critical for deciding 
whether a resource consent application must be publicly notified or receive a hearing 
by the council, and they are critical for the efficiency and consistency with which 
development proposals are processed. Development proposals may vary in scale from 
works of no more than a few hundred thousand dollars worth, to ones that involve 
many millions of dollars and great technological or environmental complexity.  Staff 
planners need to be able to assess whether the proposal provides sufficient 
information for accurate assessment of its environmental effects, and they need to 
know where to obtain such assessments inside or outside of council.  
Local Government Planning and ‘Workload’ Responsibilities 
The processing of development applications for landuse and subdivision is the key 
work task of most district administrative planning departments in New Zealand.  The 
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assessment of planning practice is often judged on the basis of the number of 
applications dealt with and within specified timeframes.  These provide a quantitative 
measure for administrators and are also a means by which outside interests can judge 
the efficiency and importance of planners.  But development applications are usually 
only a small proportion of the work load of an office. While the corporate annual 
report may record the number and timeliness of official responsibilities (such as 
development applications, council hearings, and the like), they seldom note daily 
enquiries for information, or time consuming meetings with prospective developers 
before the application stage.   And yet it is frequently the quality of informal 
interaction which planners have with the public that helps to generate public 
understanding of planning objectives and a climate of public trust in the development 
process.  If planners can spend time courteously and politely responding to enquiries, 
they may avoid future misunderstandings on the part of the public or prospective 
developers.  Thus many planners feel obliged to spend time on the informal work 
while knowing that they are often judged on the formal, recorded "outputs" that 
appear on the annual report and job performance reviews.  
 
This survey of local council planners was intended to identify some of the pressures 
which may affect the capacity of planners to perform their formally recognised 
administrative tasks, by focusing specifically on a type of task which is not often 
officially noted, namely general planning enquiries.  General enquiries may range 
from casual requests over the phone or over the office counter, for information that 
can be answered on the spot, to requests that may take perhaps an hour or more of 
patient explanation and suggestion to a prospective applicant. Enquiries do not 
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represent the total workload of a department, but it seems reasonable to suppose that 
they might represent an indicator of variations in the nature and scale of more 
formally recognised planning tasks (for example, variations in daily or seasonal 
workloads, and variations between councils). 
A limitation on the research stems from the fact that it involved a postal questionnaire, 
sent shortly before the Christmas break (i.e. the New Zealand university summer 
vacation).  Because the survey relied on a self-administered questionnaire at a time 
when New Zealand planners are generally very busy (because many applicants wish to 
get their applications completed before the Christmas break),  it could not ask for 
extensive or complex information. Because of the limitations of a postal 
questionnaire, it was not possible to obtain information that would provide a precise 
estimate of the total workload experienced by planning staff, or the variation in the 
quality and extent of staffing resources available to process development applications.  
However, the results did provide a very clear indication of the variation among district 
council planning agencies in terms of work responsibilities, staffing resources, and the 
ebb and flow of work pressures. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Average number of planning inquiries per planner per day 
  Busy 
Day 
Slow 
Day 
Av. No. 
Full-time 
Inquiries/ staff 
member - Busy 
Inquiries/ staff 
member - Slow 
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Staff Day Day 
City Councils 139 71 25.2 5.5 2.8 
District Councils  31 12 4.6 6.7 2.6 
Unitary Auth’ties 50 30 10.7 4.7 2.8 
All  56 26.4 9.1 6.2 2.9 
 
Table 1 shows the average number of inquiries on a busy day and a slow day, and the 
average number of staff that different types of council planning departments employ.  
 
Table 1 also shows that districts (generally smaller, less urban councils) experience 
greater variation between busy and slow days than cities, and that the number of 
inquiries per staff is more variable.   This suggests that development applications are 
more likely to experience workload blockages  (as a consequence of other work 
getting in the way) from district councils than city councils.  
 
An estimate of council planning workloads that records more formal planning tasks 
has been published by the Ministry for the Environment (Environment 1998). It shows 
a range of information representing the administrative work outputs of district 
councils, including the number of land subdivision consents, land use consents and 
building consents, the number and proportion of applications that required public 
notification, and the number and  proportion of consents that involved a public 
hearing.  As with the survey for this paper, the figures show wide variation between 
different councils.  For example, in relation to building consents the number ranged 
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from 96 for one council to 3902 for another, and relation to land use applications the 
number ranged from 3 to 1647).   
 
Responsibilities and Functions of Local Government Planning Departments 
A wide range of regulatory functions are frequently associated with district council 
planning departments.  Although in larger councils, regulatory planning may be a 
distinct unit, this is not the case in the smaller councils, where it is often associated 
with other functions such as animal control (dogs and stock), environmental health, 
building safety, fencing of swimming pools, liquor, dangerous goods, noise control 
and Civil Defence. Table 2 illustrates this variation in responsibilities. 
Table 2  Functions of planning units other than development control 
 All Councils City 
Councils 
District 
Councils 
Unitary 
Authorities 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Compliance monitoring 55 85.9 11 84.6 41 85.4 3 100 
Enforcement 48 75.0 10 76.9 36 75.0 2 66.7 
Building applications 31 48.4 5 38.5 24 50.0 2 66.7 
Env’l/ Public Health 21 32.8 2 15.4 18 37.5 1 33.3 
District Plans 20 31.3 4 30.8 16 33.3 0 0.0 
Liquor Licensing 17 26.6 1 7.6 16 33.3 0 0.0 
Dog control 14 21.9 0 0.0 13 27.1 1 33.3 
Land Information 12 18.8 2 15.4 10 20.8 0 0.0 
Policy Development 10 15.6 1 7.6 9 18.8 0 0.0 
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Wandering Stock 9 14.1 0 0.0 9 18.8 0 0.0 
State of Environment 
reporting 
8 12.5 1 7.6 6 12.5 1 33.3 
Dangerous Goods 7 10.9 0 0.0 7 14.6 0 0.0 
Parking 6 9.4 0 0.0 5 10.4 1 33.3 
Noise 6 9.4 1 7.6 4 8.3 0 0.0 
Civil Defence 5 7.8 0 0.0 5 10.4 0 0.0 
Strategic Planning 4 6.3 1 7.6 3 6.3 0 0.0 
Street Names/ Numbers 4 6.3 1 7.6 3 6.3 0 0.0 
Rural Fires/ Emergency  4 6.3 0 0.0 4 8.3 0 0.0 
Bylaws 4 6.3 1 7.6 3 6.3 0 0.0 
Advice 2 3.1 0 0.0 2 4.2 0 0.0 
Education 2 3.1 0 0.0 2 4.2 0 0.0 
Consultation with 
Maori  
2 3.1 0 0.0 2 4.2 0 0.0 
Litter 2 3.1 0 0.0 2 4.2 0 0.0 
Spillages 2 3.1 0 0.0 2 4.2 0 0.0 
Swimming Pools 2 3.1 0 0.0 2 4.2 0 0.0 
Other 9 14.1 3 22.8 5 10.4 1 33.3 
 
Other than developmental control, the most common functions of planning offices are 
development compliance monitoring, to check that development applicants comply 
with conditions of consent,  (85.9 percent of all respondents), and enforcement (75.0 
percent). Over a third of the city respondents, half of the district respondents and two 
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thirds of the unitary authorities had some input into building consents.  This ranged 
from checking consents for compliance with the district plan, to processing the whole 
application. 
 
Around a third of each of the city and district council respondents had input to their 
city or district plan (i.e. policy development).  This varied in scale from writing the 
plan to making suggestions based on experiences under existing plans as to what 
works or does not work in that district. 
 
Only 8 of the 64 departments were involved in State of the Environment reporting and 
only two reported that they were responsible for consultation with Maori.  Given that 
both State of the Environment reporting and consultation with Maori receive high 
statutory backing in the RMA, this lack of involvement by departments of planning 
administration is regrettable.  It suggests that administrative planning departments are 
removed from two important components of the Act. 
 
Conversely the  variety of  non-RMA responsibilities allocated to administrative 
planning departments is also cause for concern because it may prevent planners from 
giving due professional attention to wider, non-regulatory aspects of RMA planning, 
(such as public education of planning policies and procedures) and it may conflict 
with development consent processes.  The planning procedures of the RMA are 
subject to tight timeframes.  It may not be possible for planning staff to keep to the 
statutory timeframes if other responsibilities intervene.  Many of the alternative 
responsibilities may be urgent or impossible to avoid, because of their intrinsic nature 
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(e.g. counter inquiries, the endless round of meetings) or because of political deadlines 
(e.g. council meeting schedules).  Such responsibilities can draw staff time and 
attention away from formal planning activities (such as assessment of development 
proposals, negotiation and facilitation) and thereby draw the attention of the planning 
critics.  
Competing Local Government Responsibilities and Priorities 
The Local Government Act mandates councils to perform a wide range of activities 
and services, some of which are mandatory, or, in a political sense, highly obligatory. 
These include disposal of rubbish, roads, reserves and recreation (sports fields etc.), 
water and sewage waste, control of building and development, animal control (e.g. 
wandering dogs and stock), noise control, libraries and community services, 
environmental health, and many more. 
 
The conflict between planning/resource management responsibilities and other 
responsibilities can be politically compelling.  If a sewage system, roadworks, or 
water supply system is not working, the whole community, or large sectors of it, are 
affected; if the resource management function is inefficient, only the directly affected 
developers are likely to know about it.  
 
Even if local authorities wish to perform their resource management responsibilities 
efficiently and effectively, many of their competing responsibilities are expensive and 
more urgent.   Construction and maintenance of roads, water mains, and sewer mains 
tend to take precedence over the protection or restoration of natural and physical 
resources.  For rural districts, community playing fields for rugby or soccer tend to be 
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viewed as more necessary than safeguarding the life supporting capacity of 
ecosystems, or sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources for future 
generations. 
 
District councils in particular must respond to a variety of functional demands, of 
which development regulation under the RMA is only one.  In many cases, seasonal or 
other fluctuations (e.g. related to the business cycle), make it hard for councils to 
predict or respond to peaks and demands in the development workload without 
imposing strain or extra cost on ratepayers or other sections of administration within 
council.  Rural decline over the past few decades means that geographically 
widespread rural local authorities which depend on a small rating base to fund an 
expensive network of rural roads and other services are especially disinclined to incur 
extra costs for development that involves conservation of a biophysical resource base, 
that, to the untrained eye, may appear to show few obvious signs of stress.  
 
We can suppose that where competing statutory responsibilities (for roads, water, 
sewerage, and the like) are pressing, and funding sources limited, the resources given 
to a council's planning department may not allow the department to carry out its 
administrative responsibilities under the RMA effectively.  In these cases, poor 
planning performance may reflect administrative and political priorities rather than  
statutory deficiencies of the RMA. 
 
Professional Knowledge and Skill 
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Apart from the size and scale of different councils, the capacity of local government to 
administer the provisions of the RMA depends greatly on the knowledge, commitment 
and skill of staff, and on their relationships with developers, landowners, and 
members of the public. The RMA has introduced fundamentally different approaches 
and criteria for the assessment of development proposals, and introduced concepts 
which are new and strange to planners trained under a 'town and country planning' 
paradigm, and to many old-time officers of local government.  As noted by Roper-
Lindsay (1997:18 - 23), the RMA requires local authorities to deal with subject areas 
(the natural and physical environment) that were, prior to the implementation of that 
Act, only peripheral to their core concerns.  Even today, 8 years after the Act came 
into power, many local authority staff have little understanding of ecosystem 
structures and processes, the habitat requirements of  indigenous species, or the 
biophysical dynamics of air, water, soil, and coastal and marine systems. 
 
Within every organisation, there is "institutional drag" created by past history of 
knowledge and ways of doing things. Staff involved in land management build up 
relationships within the organisation and with individuals and interest groups outside. 
In many councils there is a division between staff involved with RMA procedures, 
and staff involved with operations (streets, reserves, water and sewage, flood control, 
etc.).  While those involved directly with the RMA usually have a reasonable 
understanding of the purpose, principles, and administrative procedures and 
timeframes of the Act, staff involved in other areas of council seldom have such 
knowledge.  They may feel opposed to or impatient of the RMA requirements (for 
public consultation for example, or consultation with indigenous Maori landowners).  
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Thus, despite the legislation, we have officials and resource consent administrators 
who do things the way they have always been done. 
 
It should be noted that even among professional planners, the knowledge base 
required by the RMA may be inadequate for efficient and effective implementation of 
the legislative objectives.  Unlike the former Town and Country Planning Act, the 
RMA, gives little attention to social and economic matters and great emphasis to 
biophysical objectives and development control criteria.  Planners with backgrounds 
in the social sciences or design professions are handicapped by a lack of relevant 
knowledge and understanding by which to assess development proposals under the 
RMA.  
 
Lack of professional knowledge and judgement in relation to biophysical processes 
means that planners are particularly vulnerable to the pressures imposed by 
development applicants to minimise time delays and minimise the potential of 
detrimental environmental effects.   Requests by planning administrators for more 
information about environmental effects may be viewed by development applicants as 
obstructive delaying tactics rather than genuine concern. 
 
Macro-social trends 
The Resource Management Act 1991 was enacted virtually in tandem with a radical 
restructuring of local government  completed in 1989 (Memon 1993: 71 - 85).  
Drafting of the RMA and the legislative provisions for local government restructuring 
involved  joint meetings of central government officials involved in each exercise.   
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The allocation of planning responsibilities under the RMA was consistent with the 
restructured form of local and regional government. (Palmer 1995: 145 - 174.) 
 
However, the restructuring of local government did not necessarily remove 
intergovernmental impediments to good planning and it did not stop at the point of 
RMA enactment.  Many of the changes that have continued in local government since 
its restructuring have impacted on the practice of planning by resisting or undermining 
the principles put forward in the legislation. 
 
Frieder  notes that the sweeping state sector reforms of the 1980s "left senior officials 
accountable for financial performance and somehow less accountable for performance 
in other policy areas such as Maori- Pakeha (European New Zealander) partnerships, 
intergovenrmental partnerships, public participation, and integrated environmental 
management." (1998:20) 
 
Dixon et al suggest that one reason for variable administrative performance is that 
"repeated organisational restructuring since the reform of local government in 1989 
has resulted in new styles of operation within councils, including the setting up of 
business units to deal with some activities.   A common feature of this restructuring 
has been to separate out regulation from policy.  This has had the unfortunate 
consequence of regulatory activities, such as the administration of resource consents, 
being regarded as the 'poor cousin' of policy matters" (1998:607),  In addition, 
repeated restructuring  has sometimes resulted in losses of corporate  memory, and 
losses of key staff. 
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Policies, Practice, and the Impact of Context on Legislative Intent 
The foregoing discussion has identified a number of reasons why planning practice in 
New Zealand may not live up to the expectations of some of the public, and why there 
may  be contention about the value and effectiveness of planning legislation.  These 
can be summarised as: 
 Lack of interagency coordination and co-operation in plan preparation and plan 
implementation; 
 Variable and inconsistent administrative workloads, which may cause delays and 
inefficiencies in the processing of development applications; 
 Competing political and administrative priorities, which limit the staffing resources 
allocated by councils to their planning responsibilities; 
 Variable levels of knowledge and skill in relation to the policies and criteria 
imposed by the new legislation, both among planners and within the wider 
community of officials, politicians and professionals who become involved in the 
planning process; 
 Political pressures from representatives of development interests to minimise the 
delays and costs inherent in any planning process; 
 Macro-social  trends which have impacted on the public service through 
progressive waves of restructuring, sometimes causing disruption and 
organisational weakness in relation to planning administration. 
I believe that the New Zealand experience in relation to the Resource Management 
Act has features which are both common to planning practice elsewhere, and unique 
to New Zealand.  Features common with planning practice elsewhere include 
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problems of inter-agency co-operation and plan integration; problems of corporate 
accountability and efficiency, political priorities, and the conflict between a "customer 
service" ethic and a "public service" ethic.  A problem which I think might be 
especially characteristic of New Zealand, and due to the particular biophysical 
emphasis of the RMA, is the general lack of professional expertise in relation to 
ecological and biophysical processes.   
 
I believe that this lack may afflict the planning profession as a whole, coming as it 
does from an early history of social welfare and reform based on urban European and 
North American conditions.  By history and training, I suspect that the planning 
profession are not well prepared to deal with issues related to natural environmental 
processes. This deficiency is less obvious in other countries because the biophysical 
base is only one of the aspects considered by planners, whereas in New Zealand, it is a 
large component of the legislative mandate.  Given the increasing importance of 
biophysical limits to human expansion, it may be that the planning profession as a 
whole may need to become increasingly knowledgeable about environmental and 
ecosystem processes. 
Conclusion 
Inevitably, much of the criticism that planners face is a consequence of their role in 
the development process where society is divided by interest groups and divisions of 
power.  Because planning interfaces with property and place, there is always likely to 
be an element of conflict and criticism. 
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In the case of New Zealand, the criticisms of planning practice come from at least two 
directions: those (mostly developers and resource users) who say that planning 
practitioners and the legislation is unnecessarily obstructive, and those who say that 
planners are not fulfilling the principles and policies of sustainable management, as 
set out in the Resource Management Act.   In practice, the abilities of planners to 
implement the provisions of the Act effectively are compromised by a series of 
factors, some of which relate to the profession and its history of professional 
expertise, but others of which are outside the ability of planners to change.  The 
capacity of planners to respond constructively to the political and practical pressures 
placed upon them may be compromised by broader social and political factors that 
structure the context within which they work and by the personal and political 
pressures to which they are subjected on a day-to-day basis within the planning office. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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